The Identification Logic of Transfer Payment "Performance Black Holes": A Theoretical Analysis based on Budget-to-Actual Deviation

Yuwei Liu; Yan Jiang; Yaru Su

doi:10.6981/FEM.202611_7(11).0004

Authors

Yuwei Liu College of Business, Chengdu University, Chengdu, Sichuan 610106, China
Yan Jiang College of Business, Chengdu University, Chengdu, Sichuan 610106, China
Yaru Su College of Business, Chengdu University, Chengdu, Sichuan 610106, China

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.6981/FEM.202611_7(11).0004

Keywords:

Transfer Payments; Performance Black Hole; Budget-to-Actual Deviation.

Abstract

The expansion and structural optimization of transfer payments have not been accompanied by commensurate performance gains. This paper conceptualizes the persistent disconnect between capital inputs and policy objectives as a "performance black hole." Budget-to-actual deviation arises at the interface between budgeting and execution and can therefore serve as a process-oriented identification signal. Yet its association with performance loss is only probabilistic, and a single aggregate measure cannot readily separate genuine losses from normal institutional frictions. We argue that such deviation qualifies as a basis for identification only when three conditions are jointly satisfied: persistence, structurality, and inexplicability. On this basis, we develop a three-dimensional identification framework-Type, Objective, and Dimension-to determine the types of transfer payments in which the performance black hole is most pronounced.

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