The Impact of Local Government Overtime on Urban Economic Growth: Evidence from 313 Cities in China
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.6981/FEM.202607_7(7).0020Keywords:
Local Government; Overtime Intensity; Urban Economic Growth;Abstract
Existing research on overtime work has primarily focused on the corporate level, with insufficient attention paid to overtime phenomena at the government level-and even less to their impact on urban economic growth. Therefore, this study aims to explore the influence of local government overtime(LGO) on urban economic growth(UEG) and its micro-level mechanism of action. Employing a two-way fixed effects model, we analyze panel data of 313 cities in China from 2012 to 2025. Empirical results indicate that LGO exerts a significant inverted U-shaped relationship with UEG. Mechanism analysis reveals that LGO affects UEG mainly by altering government innovation capacity. Moderating effect analysis demonstrates that government digital transformation plays a moderating role in the relationship between LGO and UEG.
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