A Game-Theoretic Study on the Evolution of Carbon Emission Reduction Strategies among Chemical Companies under a Carbon Trading Mechanism

Abstract

With the national carbon market set to expand coverage to the chemical industry, chemical enterprises face strategic divergence and interaction between two options: achieving emissions reductions through proprietary technologies, or purchasing carbon allowances to meet compliance obligations. This paper incorporates key parameters including carbon price, the severity of government penalties, differences in emission reduction costs, and low-carbon subsidies to construct an evolutionary game model of the interaction between local governments and chemical enterprises under the carbon trading mechanism. Based on this model, this paper employs numerical simulation methods to systematically analyze the evolutionary paths and steady-state conditions of group strategies under different parameter combinations. The results indicate that the system exhibits four evolutionary equilibrium states, and periodic fluctuations are the most common transitional state in carbon emission reduction governance. This phenomenon essentially stems from a "regulation–relaxation" cycle caused by asymmetric incentive structures between the government and enterprises. The ideal equilibrium can be achieved through two pathways: market-driven and policy-guided. Among these, the policy-guided equilibrium combines endogenous dynamics with regulatory safeguards, and delivers greater stability and sustainability. Finally, based on the research findings, this paper proposes targeted recommendations from the perspectives of both the government and chemical enterprises.